The construction of the sex abuse scandal in the Catholic Church originates from many angles. Philip Jenkins’ work, Pedophiles and Priests: Anatomy of a Contemporary Crisis, attempts to distill all the pressures for reform into the most pertinent elements, organized around a central theme: All the pressure points for reform had the effect of pushing the Catholic Church from a “sect” to a “church”. The three most compelling aspects of Jenkins’ argument are litigation, the media, and internal division. Once placing these factors within the argument, we can then critically evaluate Jenkins’ overall argument.
Litigation is potentially the most dangerous aspect of the scandal for the Roman Catholic Church. Damage awards have the ability to cripple the church, and at a speed not rivaled by bad media coverage. In addition, the possibility of high damages encourages false accusations, and true accusers who might have otherwise elected not to sue (125). Another interesting point deals with the litigation turning the church and victims (and their families) into enemies. The church could not reasonably be expected to preemptively help victims with medical costs, or even express sympathy, as this might be an admission of guilt. Two things make the case for Jenkins: First, the presence of litigation and openness to civil authorities shows a lessening of tension between the sect and wider culture. Second, the threat of successful litigation means the ability to extract concessions in doctrine and practice. Litigation also attracted one of the other agents for change, the media.
The media’s main function, according to Jenkins, was as a weapon against the hierarchy in the hands of the Catholic laity. The media gave reform groups within Catholicism a platform to express their grievances. Unwittingly, they gave the most credence to groups suggesting a change in the authority structure itself. For Jenkins, this fits with the media’s tendency to favor American democratic institutions. For them, it was a patriotic impulse Jenkins notes, with the authoritarian Roman Catholic Europe trying to drag its American branch backward toward traditional values and practices, and liberalizing trends within, nurtured by the media. The governance of the church has long been an issue with anti-Catholic and anticlerical groups. If the church looks like it is governed like an American representative democracy, this is an accommodation to the society at large, and is huge evidence of the transition from sect to church.
The internal division of the Catholic Church is a major factor in the pressure for change, according to Jenkins. Whether feminists pushing for the ordination of women, gay advocates, or their conservative traditionalist counterparts, the political factions in the Catholic Church have all seemingly had one target, according to Jenkins—the hierarchy. As we have discussed, the media has a preference for decentralized, democratic institutions. Groups on the left and the right took this into account, skillfully making political use out of doctrinal clarification stressing the equality of clergy and laity to draw firm distinctions between themselves and church leadership. The mere existence of this distinction demonstrates the culture’s intrusion into matters of faith—a politicizing of spiritual matters that betrays previous portraits of religious communities of unified bodies that impacted culture, but were not impacted by it. What makes these conflicts so important is that the threat to leave the church is real. The power of the threat is the realization by liberalizing groups that the image of unanimity is more important that doctrinal or spiritual purity. The nature of Catholicism (and some Protestant communities with episcopalian governance) is that strong authority and the appearance of harmony is desirable for leadership. The thrust of Jenkins’ argument is that leadership can concede points of doctrine and practice, reducing overall tension between Catholicism and the wider American culture, or decentralize power, minimizing itself as a target. In either case, Catholicism in the US will have become a church because the cultural pressures are too strong to maintain it as a sprawling, influential sect. Protestantism as a whole made the choice centuries ago that unity which leads to widespread accommodation to culture wasn’t worth it. To that end, decentralization and fracture was a regrettable side effect of preservation. Smaller communities with marginal impacts individually can afford to live in tension with culture; big ones cannot.
Three specific factors are instrumental in making Philip Jenkins’ argument that the American Catholic Church is in transition from a sect to a church. Specifically, these are litigation, the media, and church politics. Other factors were less compelling for that case. Psychology and the rise of therapeutic culture were mentioned as important catalysts, but the backlash within a receptive and reform-friendly media seems in the end to make the impact of psychologists and experts a wash. Media quickness to correct perceived excess, and in essence, to roll back successes and influence of groups that stood to benefit from abuse claims makes their ultimate influence unclear.
Also, that skepticism in the realm of therapy is linked to the cyclical nature of attitudes on child sexual abuse. I do not think a credible linkage can be made here because the skepticism about therapy (especially memory recovery) was created by actual cases of manipulation and error, not simply that the public had grown weary of the issue. Secondly, Jenkins merely asserts that attitudes on sexual abuse have been cyclical; he does not prove it. The repeal of sex psychopath laws in the 1960s does not prove that society had become more tolerant of abuse. In fact, Jenkins lumps behaviors together when talking about loosening sexual mores in the 1960s, but makes distinctions to prove the new “outrage” in the 1980s (77-79). What about cases originating entirely in the “age of sensitivity” from the mid-80s to the present? He claims that they were operating in a new cultural context when the abuse was discovered than when it occurred. But the Church of the 80s and 1990s should be well aware of the new context by now, and yet they rightly suffer criticism for inaction and favoring rehabilitation to removal.
In addition, Jenkins argues that the Protestant Reformation was a telling transition point for Protestant transition from a sect to a church in that the democratic nature of it was an accommodation to prevailing culture. As noted above, American Catholicism faces a similar decision point. However, it could be argued that the Reformation was a refusal to assimilate, in that the Church had become so political that it was indistinguishable from the surrounding culture. Perhaps the split was due to the noticeable lack of tension with culture, not a boiling over.
In sum, Philip Jenkins persuasively argues that the American Catholic Church is becoming a church as opposed to a sect in the sociological sense. Litigation, the media, and Church politics show the intermingling of cultural trends consistent with a religious body no longer in significant tension with the surrounding society. Points concerning therapy and changing attitudes about sexual abuse are less convincing for lack of evidence. Still, Pedophiles and Priests is very useful in mapping possible directions for Catholicism in America.
Litigation is potentially the most dangerous aspect of the scandal for the Roman Catholic Church. Damage awards have the ability to cripple the church, and at a speed not rivaled by bad media coverage. In addition, the possibility of high damages encourages false accusations, and true accusers who might have otherwise elected not to sue (125). Another interesting point deals with the litigation turning the church and victims (and their families) into enemies. The church could not reasonably be expected to preemptively help victims with medical costs, or even express sympathy, as this might be an admission of guilt. Two things make the case for Jenkins: First, the presence of litigation and openness to civil authorities shows a lessening of tension between the sect and wider culture. Second, the threat of successful litigation means the ability to extract concessions in doctrine and practice. Litigation also attracted one of the other agents for change, the media.
The media’s main function, according to Jenkins, was as a weapon against the hierarchy in the hands of the Catholic laity. The media gave reform groups within Catholicism a platform to express their grievances. Unwittingly, they gave the most credence to groups suggesting a change in the authority structure itself. For Jenkins, this fits with the media’s tendency to favor American democratic institutions. For them, it was a patriotic impulse Jenkins notes, with the authoritarian Roman Catholic Europe trying to drag its American branch backward toward traditional values and practices, and liberalizing trends within, nurtured by the media. The governance of the church has long been an issue with anti-Catholic and anticlerical groups. If the church looks like it is governed like an American representative democracy, this is an accommodation to the society at large, and is huge evidence of the transition from sect to church.
The internal division of the Catholic Church is a major factor in the pressure for change, according to Jenkins. Whether feminists pushing for the ordination of women, gay advocates, or their conservative traditionalist counterparts, the political factions in the Catholic Church have all seemingly had one target, according to Jenkins—the hierarchy. As we have discussed, the media has a preference for decentralized, democratic institutions. Groups on the left and the right took this into account, skillfully making political use out of doctrinal clarification stressing the equality of clergy and laity to draw firm distinctions between themselves and church leadership. The mere existence of this distinction demonstrates the culture’s intrusion into matters of faith—a politicizing of spiritual matters that betrays previous portraits of religious communities of unified bodies that impacted culture, but were not impacted by it. What makes these conflicts so important is that the threat to leave the church is real. The power of the threat is the realization by liberalizing groups that the image of unanimity is more important that doctrinal or spiritual purity. The nature of Catholicism (and some Protestant communities with episcopalian governance) is that strong authority and the appearance of harmony is desirable for leadership. The thrust of Jenkins’ argument is that leadership can concede points of doctrine and practice, reducing overall tension between Catholicism and the wider American culture, or decentralize power, minimizing itself as a target. In either case, Catholicism in the US will have become a church because the cultural pressures are too strong to maintain it as a sprawling, influential sect. Protestantism as a whole made the choice centuries ago that unity which leads to widespread accommodation to culture wasn’t worth it. To that end, decentralization and fracture was a regrettable side effect of preservation. Smaller communities with marginal impacts individually can afford to live in tension with culture; big ones cannot.
Three specific factors are instrumental in making Philip Jenkins’ argument that the American Catholic Church is in transition from a sect to a church. Specifically, these are litigation, the media, and church politics. Other factors were less compelling for that case. Psychology and the rise of therapeutic culture were mentioned as important catalysts, but the backlash within a receptive and reform-friendly media seems in the end to make the impact of psychologists and experts a wash. Media quickness to correct perceived excess, and in essence, to roll back successes and influence of groups that stood to benefit from abuse claims makes their ultimate influence unclear.
Also, that skepticism in the realm of therapy is linked to the cyclical nature of attitudes on child sexual abuse. I do not think a credible linkage can be made here because the skepticism about therapy (especially memory recovery) was created by actual cases of manipulation and error, not simply that the public had grown weary of the issue. Secondly, Jenkins merely asserts that attitudes on sexual abuse have been cyclical; he does not prove it. The repeal of sex psychopath laws in the 1960s does not prove that society had become more tolerant of abuse. In fact, Jenkins lumps behaviors together when talking about loosening sexual mores in the 1960s, but makes distinctions to prove the new “outrage” in the 1980s (77-79). What about cases originating entirely in the “age of sensitivity” from the mid-80s to the present? He claims that they were operating in a new cultural context when the abuse was discovered than when it occurred. But the Church of the 80s and 1990s should be well aware of the new context by now, and yet they rightly suffer criticism for inaction and favoring rehabilitation to removal.
In addition, Jenkins argues that the Protestant Reformation was a telling transition point for Protestant transition from a sect to a church in that the democratic nature of it was an accommodation to prevailing culture. As noted above, American Catholicism faces a similar decision point. However, it could be argued that the Reformation was a refusal to assimilate, in that the Church had become so political that it was indistinguishable from the surrounding culture. Perhaps the split was due to the noticeable lack of tension with culture, not a boiling over.
In sum, Philip Jenkins persuasively argues that the American Catholic Church is becoming a church as opposed to a sect in the sociological sense. Litigation, the media, and Church politics show the intermingling of cultural trends consistent with a religious body no longer in significant tension with the surrounding society. Points concerning therapy and changing attitudes about sexual abuse are less convincing for lack of evidence. Still, Pedophiles and Priests is very useful in mapping possible directions for Catholicism in America.
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